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Abstract

Intuition and moral beliefs are used unconsciously in every day decision making, with
intuition being the main decision maker and moral foundations providing reasoning for a decision.
Intuition refers to the gut feelings a person may have about a situation or decision. Moral
foundations refer to themes of morality that individuals may rely on. Under varying circumstances,
different moral beliefs may be more salient and important when making a judgement. Given the role
that both of these play in everyday decision making, this study aimed to explore the relationship
between the three types of intuition (holistic, inferential, and affective) and the five moral
foundations (harm/care, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and
sanctity/degradation) and how different thinking styles, namely analytic and intuitive thinking styles,
would influence the moral foundations that are relied on when making moral decisions. It was
hypothesized that the three types of intuition would be related to the sanctity/degradation moral
foundation and that these relationships would be positive. Furthermore, it was expected that
participants under cognitive load would rely more on individualizing moral values when making
moral judgements. Results showed the strongest relationship between the harm/care moral
foundation and affective intuition. Thinking styles did not affect the moral foundations that
participants relied on when making moral decisions.

Moral Foundations and Thinking Styles

3

Examining Moral Foundations and Thinking Styles
Making decisions is an important aspect of our lives. Some decisions require more overt
consideration, such as determining what to eat for lunch that day, while other decisions are more
covert, such as determining which food item to start eating first. Regardless of the nature of a
decision, different cognitive processes are involved and personal beliefs can influence the final
decision that is made. Personal beliefs elicit emotional responses within people that can affect their
judgments. Moral foundations, deeply held beliefs associated with morality that influence
judgements, are related to personal beliefs and may be relied on for decision making in different
ways when in diverse situations (Haidt, 2012). Dual process theory is discussed here along with
research on moral foundations and how they relate to intuition.
Different thinking styles, ways of thinking that vary based on the cognitive processes being
used, may result in different decisions being made (Evans, 2010; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Given
that both thinking styles and moral beliefs affect people’s decisions and judgements, it is possible
that the two would be related. This could go beyond a simple relationship. Thinking styles may
affect the different moral foundations people rely on when making judgements or decisions.
Dual Process Theory
The dual process theory states that there are two different cognitive processes, Type 1 and
Type 2 (Evans, 2010; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Type 1 processing is automatic and quick, and
often occurs without conscious awareness. This type of processing does not require working memory
and is able to handle a higher capacity of information. Type 2 processing, on the other hand, is a
much slower and analytical type of processing, and requires conscious effort. This processing style
requires working memory and cannot handle a large capacity of information. Given this requirement
of working memory for analytical processing, it is clear that individuals who are put under a
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cognitive load would be forced to rely more on Type 1 processing because they would not have the
cognitive resources that are necessary to complete Type 2 processing.
Intuition. Intuition is understood to be a form of Type 1, automatic processing (Evans,
2010). Numerous definitions of intuition have been proposed over the years (Abernathy & Hamm,
1995) and it has been noted that most of these definitions explain intuition in terms of what it is not
rather than what it is (Epstein, 2010). Pretz et al. (2014) overcame this trend by identifying intuition
as an initial gut reaction or the immediate feelings people have about the decision options that are
present in a given situation. This intuitive knowledge comes about unconsciously and people are not
able to recognize where this knowledge originates from (Epstein, 2010).
Types of Intuition. Intuition can further be defined in terms of different types of intuition.
Pretz and Totz (2007) identified three unique types of intuition: holistic intuition, inferential
intuition, and affective intuition. Holistic intuition is defined as non-analytic judgements that are
made based on the holistic integration of various information and cues. These judgements are not
obvious in nature. Inferential intuition is defined as a process that was once analytic but has become
automatic in nature as a result of practice. This process is based on inferences that have been made.
Finally, affective intuition is defined as emotionally driven judgements based on a person’s
emotional reaction to a given situation.
Analytical Thinking. Analytical thinking is a form of Type 2 processing that involves
thinking through intuitive decisions and possibly overriding those thoughts or decisions (Pennycook,
Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015). This style of thinking is slower and more deliberate, and involves
more cognitive resources. A similar term, cognitive reflection, has been used to refer to this thinking
style as well. Frederick (2005) defines cognitive reflection as the ability to move past initial thoughts
and refrain from responding to a question or problem with the first response that comes to mind.
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This is often measured through the use of the Cognitive Reflection Task in which correct answers to
three questions can only be arrived at through analytical thinking and Type 2 processing.
Moral Foundations
Moral foundations are deep-set beliefs that people hold and can influence people’s
judgements and decision making. Haidt (2012) identified five moral foundations: harm/care,
fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. The harm/care
moral foundation reflects a person’s sensitivity towards cruelty and harm. The fairness/cheating
moral foundation is driven by whether or not someone thinks another person will be good to work
and collaborate with. The loyalty/betrayal moral foundation focuses on a person’s assessment of the
extent to which others will be a team player and support their own in-group. The
authority/subversion moral foundation refers to a person’s assessment of ranks and positions of
authority and acting appropriately according to those ranks or positions. Finally, the
sanctity/degradation moral foundation reflects beliefs that some acts are disgusting and unnatural
and are, therefore, immoral. These sanctity/degradation beliefs regarding purity help bind people
together.
Pennycook et al. (2015) categorized the five moral foundations into two different groupings.
Individualizing moral values include the harm/care and fairness/cheating moral foundations whereas
binding moral values include the loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation
moral foundations. These moral foundations can be used to explain how various cultures have
different views and reliance on morality (Haidt & Joseph, 2004), and the moral foundations that
people rely on the most are different for people of varying political backgrounds (Graham, Haidt, &
Nosek, 2008). Liberals depends mostly on individualizing moral values whereas conservatives
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depend mostly on binding moral values (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008; Haidt & Graham, 2007;
Pennycook et al., 2015).
Moral Foundations and Intuition
The five moral foundations are closely related to intuition with certain relationships being
stronger than the others. Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, and Fugelsang (2014) noted a negative
relationship between binding moral values, namely the loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and
sanctity/degradation moral foundations. Some researchers have gone beyond looking at simple
relationships and have examined the effects that thinking styles may have on moral judgements.
Tinghög et al. (2016) asked participants to respond to moral judgement scenarios while under
cognitive load, inducing an intuitive thinking style. They noted that an intuitive thinking style did
not influence participants’ responses on the moral judgement scenarios. Greene, Morelli,
Lowenberg, Nystrom, and Cohen (2008) conducted a similar study in which participants under
cognitive load responded to high-conflict moral dilemmas. However, in contrast to the findings of
Tinghög et al. (2016), Greene et al. (2008) noted that cognitive load increased participants’ response
times to utilitarian moral judgements, demonstrating that cognitive load can interfere with moral
judgements. Similarly, Björklund (2003) observed that participants under a time constraint, and
thereby using a more intuitive thinking style, used more justice-oriented reasoning for moral
decisions. These studies indicate that thinking styles may have an effect on moral judgements, but it
is not clear exactly what that effect is or how strong it may be.
Haidt (2012) argues that, when making moral decisions, intuition is the first step in the
decision process and a person’s moral beliefs are used to later justify the judgments or decisions the
person initially made. He found this pattern to be the strongest when feelings of disrespect and
disgust were involved. This relationship is not necessarily one way, though. It has been shown that
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morality can affect intuition. People who were primed to have an unconscious moral identity
reported decreased beliefs in the ethicality of the business field (Leavitt, Zhu, & Aquino, 2016).
Furthermore, these subtle priming cues were sufficient to change the intuitions people had about
business. Other authors have noted how specific moral foundations may influence intuitions. Schnall
and Cannon (2012) suggested that people’s moral feelings of disgust influence the way they perceive
others’ characters. Physiologically, they noted that, when people are morally offended by a situation
or decision, the situation or decisions can elicit an immediate emotional response which can later
affect their judgements. Two studies were conducted in response to this literature. The first study
looked simply at the relationship between moral foundations and types of intuition. The second
study examined how different thinking styles may influence the moral foundations that people rely
on when making decisions.
Study 1
Given the role that both intuition and moral foundations can play in making judgements and
how morality can influence intuition, it is important to examine the relationship between moral
foundations and types of intuition. Currently, no studies have looked specifically at this relationship.
As such, this study aimed to inspect the relationship between moral foundations and types of
intuition. It was hypothesized that the sanctity/degradation moral foundation would be related to the
three types of intuition and that these relationships would be positive.
Participants
91 undergraduate students at Elizabethtown College participated in this study. Participants
were between the ages of 18 and 22 years (M=19.81, SD=1.18) and 70.89% were female. Students
who were enrolled in a General Psychology course received 0.5 credit hours for participating in this
study.
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Materials
Moral Foundations Questionnaire. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Haidt,
& Nosek, 2008; see Appendix A) consisted of 32 different statements that participants were asked to
rate. These statements assessed how much each participant relied on the five moral foundations:
harm/care (“Whether or not someone suffered emotionally”), fairness/cheating (“Whether or not
some people were treated differently than others”), loyalty/betrayal (“Whether or not someone’s
action showed love for his or her country”), authority/subversion (“Whether or not someone showed
a lack of respect for authority”), and sanctity/degradation (“Whether or not someone violated
standards of purity and decency”). The first 16 statements were to be rated on a scale from 0 (not at
all relevant) to 5 (extremely relevant) based on how much participants consider these statements
when thinking and making decisions. The final 16 statements were to be rated based on how much
participants agree with the statements on a scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The
sums of the items on the different subscales were computed. Higher scores on the different moral
foundations subscales indicated more reliance on those particular foundations.
Types of Intuition Scale. The Types of Intuition Scale (Pretz et al., 2014; see Appendix B)
consisted of 23 statements that assessed how much participants relied on holistic intuition (“When
tackling a new project, I concentrate on big ideas rather than the details”), inferential intuition (“I
trust my intuitions, especially in familiar situations”), and affective intuition (“I prefer to use my
emotional hunches to deal with a problem, rather than thinking about it”) when making judgements.
Participants were asked to rate each statement on a scale from 1 (definitely false) to 5 (definitely
true) based on how true the statement is of themselves when they are making decisions or
judgements. The sum of the items for each subscale were calculated. Higher scores on the different
types of intuition subscales indicated more reliance on that particular type of intuition.
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Procedure
Participants read and signed a consent form prior to beginning the study. Participants then
completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008) and the Types of
Intuition Scale (Pretz et al., 2014). Finally, participants completed demographic information
regarding age, gender, and major of study.
Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations are reported in Table 1. Pearson Correlations were
computed for the five moral foundations and three types of intuition. All five moral foundations
were significantly positively correlated with each other with the exception of the fairness/cheating
and sanctity/degradation foundations which were not significantly correlated with one another.
Within the types of intuition, only holistic and inferential intuition were significantly related (r=.33,
p=.003). It was hypothesized that the types of intuition and the sanctity/degradation moral
foundation would be positively correlated. This hypothesis was partially supported. Affective
intuition was not significantly correlated with the sanctity/degradation foundation (r=.15, p=.2).
However, the sanctity/degradation foundation was significantly negatively correlated with both
holistic intuition (r=-.23, p=.044) and inferential intuition (r=-.24, p=.031). Contrary to the
hypothesis, these relationships were not positive. The harm/care foundation was positively correlated
with affective intuition (r=.45, p<.001) while the fairness/cheating foundation was positively
correlated with inferential intuition (r=.31, p=.006).
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to test the predictive abilities of the types of
intuition on the different moral foundations and of the moral foundations on the different types of
intuition (see Table 2). In line with the correlations, the sanctity/degradation foundation was an
almost significant predictor of holistic intuition (β=-.27, p=.056) and was a significant predictor of
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inferential intuition (β=-.28, p=.039), but was not a significant predictor of affective intuition (β=.11,
p=.411). However, neither holistic intuition (β=-.20, p=.092) nor inferential intuition (β=-.18,
p=.128) were significant predictors of the sanctity/degradation foundation. Further in line with the
correlations, affective intuition was a significant predictor of the harm/care foundation (β=.46,
p<.001) and the harm/care foundation was a significant predictor of affective intuition (β=.63,
p<.001). Finally, and again in line with the correlations, inferential intuition was a significant
predictor of the fairness/cheating foundation (β=.35, p=.002) and the fairness/cheating foundation
was an almost significant predictor of inferential intuition (β=.29, p=.051).
Discussion
Overall, there were few significant relationships between the moral foundations and types of
intuition. The strongest relationship seems to have been between the harm/care foundation and
affective intuition. This is understandable given that affective intuition focuses on a person’s
emotional response and the harm/care foundation refers to how people react to suffering and cruelty
(Haidt, 2012; Pretz & Totz, 2007). People who are in tune with their emotions may have stronger
emotional reactions when viewing or thinking about someone suffering. Given that liberals rely
heavily on the care/harm foundation, it would be interesting to see if people with liberal beliefs rely
more on affective intuition than holistic and inferential intuition (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008;
Haidt & Graham, 2007).
The hypothesis that the types of intuition would be related to the sanctity/degradation
moral foundation and that these relationships would be positive was partially supported. There was
no significant relationship between affective intuition and the sanctity/degradation foundation. The
sanctity/degradation foundation was significantly correlated with holistic and inferential intuition,
but both of these relationships were negative. Given Haidt’s (2012) argument that intuitions come
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first and moral reasoning is used second to explain a person’s judgement, these findings suggests
that individuals who rely more on holistic and inferential types of intuition do not rely on the
sanctity/degradation moral foundation as heavily and do not use the sanctity/degradation foundation
to explain their decisions and judgements. These negative relationships can be explained by the fact
that holistic and inferential intuition rely more on cognitive processes rather than emotional
processes, while the sanctity/degradation moral foundation relies heavily on emotions.
The moral foundations were best at predicting affective intuition, although this seems to have
been caused by affective intuition’s strong relationship with the harm/care foundation. No other
foundation was a significant predictor of affective intuition. Similarly, the types of intuition were
best at predicting the harm/care foundation, again with affective intuition being the only significant
predictor. None of the types of intuition were significant predictors of the loyalty/betrayal,
authority/subversion, or sanctity/degradation foundations. Only inferential intuition was a significant
predictor of the fairness/cheating foundation. This can be explained by the fact that both inferential
intuition and deciding whether or not a person would be good to collaborate with involve cognitive
processes rather than emotional processes.
Given that this study was part of a larger survey, it is possible that participants experienced
fatigue and did not spend much time on each question, or may have been primed by a previous
questionnaire. As such, future research should examine these variables in a separate study and
should counterbalance which questionnaire is completed first. This study was conducted using a
largely American population. Given that moral foundations differ across countries and cultures
(Haidt & Joseph, 2004), different results may be found if other countries and cultures were
examined. Perhaps future studies could look at how types of intuition differ across cultures and
whether or not that difference affects the relationships between the moral foundations and the types
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of intuition. Future research should also further examine the relationship between the harm/care
foundation and affective intuition to determine if there are any mediating factors. Finally, this study
was based on correlational data and did not involve any manipulation. This was taken into account
when conducting Study 2.
Study 2
Study 1 showed some significant relationships between moral foundations and intuition.
Different thinking styles, ways of thinking that vary based on the cognitive processes being used,
may result in different decisions being made (Evans, 2010; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). The current
study aimed to examine the effects that intuitive and analytic thinking styles may have on the moral
foundations that people rely on when making decisions. Thus far, no work has been done regarding
how people’s reliance on different moral foundations may change depending on the thinking style
they are using. It is expected that the results reported in Study 1 noting a positive relationship
between affective intuition and the harm/care moral foundation will be replicated in this study
(Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, negative relationships between scores on the Cognitive Reflection
Task (Frederick, 2005) and the binding moral foundations (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion,
and sanctity/degradation) are expected, replicating the results discussed by Pennycook et al. (2014;
Hypothesis 2). Given that the harm/care moral foundation is considered to be an individualizing
moral value (Pennycook et al., 2015), it is predicted that people who are using an intuitive thinking
style will rely more on individualizing moral values rather than binding moral values (Hypothesis 3).
Finally, it is predicted that people who are induced with an analytic thinking style will not differ in
their pre- and posttest moral foundations scores, but that people who are induced with an intuitive
thinking style will have scores that shift more towards individualizing moral values in their posttest
moral foundations scores as compared to their pretest moral foundations scores (Hypothesis 4).
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Participants
Thirty-four undergraduate students between the ages of 18 and 21 (M=19.09, SD=.996,
85.3% female) at Elizabethtown College participated in this study. Participants received 0.5 credit
hours towards their General Psychology course for their participation.
Materials
The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008) and the Types of
Intuition Scale (Pretz et al., 2014) administered in Study 1 were used again in Study 2.
Cognitive Reflection Task. The Cognitive Reflection Task (Frederick, 2005; see Appendix C)
assessed how well participants were able to cognitively reflect on a problem and refrain from giving
their first, intuitive answer on three word problems. These short word problems involved some
simple mathematical calculations and had an obvious, but incorrect, intuitive response (“A bat and a
ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?”).
Correct responses were obtained through analytical thinking. Participants received a point for each
question they answered correctly. If participants remembered the answer from prior experience, that
question was omitted from their score. A higher percentage of unfamiliar answers participants got
correct indicated more cognitive reflection and analytical thinking.
Moral Scenarios. The three moral scenarios (see Appendix D) incorporated both an
individualizing and binding moral foundation in each scenario (“Imagine that you are in the Army.
Your commanding officer tells you that you must leave an injured soldier behind in order to make it
to your next destination on time. You know that this soldier is suffering and will likely die without
any medical assistance. You decide to…”). Two possible responses to the scenario, one response
representing an individualizing moral foundation action (“help the injured soldier”) and the other
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response representing a binding moral foundation action (“follow the orders from your commanding
officer”), were placed on either end of a four-point sliding scale. Participants were asked to move the
scale to represent how they would behave in that scenario. Higher scores indicated a tendency to act
based on individualizing moral values.
Procedure
Participants completed this study on a computer and were randomly assigned to either a
control (analytic) or cognitive load (intuitive) condition. Participants first completed the Moral
Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008), the Types of Intuition Scale ((Pretz et
al., 2014), and the Cognitive Reflection Task (Frederick, 2005). Participants were asked to alert the
researcher after finishing these tasks and before moving on to the next task, completing the moral
scenarios and the Moral Foundations Questionnaire for a second time. The participants assigned to
the intuitive condition completed the rest of the tasks and questionnaires under cognitive load,
thereby inducing intuitive thinking. Cognitive load was induced by asking participants to listen to a
recording of random numbers being spoken and make a tally mark for every prime number that was
said. The participants assigned to the analytic condition completed the rest of the tasks and
questionnaires under the same conditions they had completed the first part of the study, allowing
them the cognitive freedom to think about their answers. Finally, participants reported demographic
information, including age and gender, and were thanked for their participation.
Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations of the measures are reported in Table 3. Cronbach’s
alpha was computed for all of the variables. The six-item harm/care pretest moral foundation
subscale (α=.620), six-item fairness/cheating pretest moral foundation subscale (α=.684), six item
loyalty/betrayal pretest moral foundation subscale (α=.549), six-item authority/subversion pretest

Moral Foundations and Thinking Styles

15

moral foundation subscale (α=.615), and six-item sanctity/degradation pretest moral foundation
subscale (α=.691) were all not reliable. The seven-item holistic intuition subscale (α=.565) and
eight-item inferential intuition subscale (α=.659) were not reliable. However, the eight-item affective
intuition subscale (α=.736) was reliable. The six-item harm/care posttest moral foundation subscale
(α=.728), six-item loyalty/betrayal posttest moral foundation subscale (α=.728), six-item
authority/subversion posttest moral foundation subscale (α=.749), and six-item sanctity/degradation
posttest moral foundation subscale (α=.775) were all reliable. However, the six-item
fairness/cheating posttest moral foundation subscale (α=.578) was not reliable. Given the lack of
reliability of some of the measures, the results of this study should be considered with caution.
Pearson’s r correlations were computed for the five moral foundations pretest, the three types
of intuition, and cognitive reflection. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, affective intuition was not correlated
with the harm/care moral foundation (r=-.167, p=.344). Furthermore, cognitive reflection scores
were not significantly correlated with the loyalty/betrayal (r=-.133, p=.536), authority/subversion
(r=-.172, p=.422), and sanctity/degradation (r=-.108, p=.616) moral foundations, contrasting
Hypothesis 2.
It was hypothesized that participants under a cognitive load and therefore using an intuitive
thinking style would rely on individualizing moral foundations (Hypothesis 3). An independent
samples t-test was conducted to compare moral scenario scores in in the control condition and under
cognitive load. Differing from Hypothesis 3, there was not a significant difference in moral scenario
scores between participants in the control condition (M=9.177, SD=.951) and participants under
cognitive load (M=9.765, SD=1.393; t(32)=1.438, p=.160). Participants in the control condition
relied on individualizing moral foundations as much as participants under cognitive load.
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Factorial ANOVAs on moral foundations are reported in Table 4. It was hypothesized that
participants’ moral foundations scores would not change from pre- to posttest when they were using
an analytic thinking style, but participants’ pre- and posttest scores would shift towards
individualizing moral foundations when they were under cognitive load and thereby using an
intuitive thinking style (Hypothesis 4). A 2 (pretest vs. posttest) X 2 (control vs. cognitive load)
factorial ANOVA was conducted to compare the main effects of time of test and condition and the
interaction effect between time of test and condition on harm/care moral foundation scores. Both
main effects were not significant (all ps>.05). The interaction effect between time of test and
condition was also not significant (Λ=.996, F(1, 32)=.126, p=.725), not confirming Hypothesis 4. A
2 (pretest vs. posttest) X 2 (control vs. cognitive load) factorial ANOVA was conducted to compare
the main effects of time of test and condition and the interaction effect between time of test and
condition on fairness/cheating moral foundation scores. Both main effects were not significant ( all
ps>.05). The interaction effect between time of test and condition was also not significant (Λ=.952,
F(1, 32)=1.622, p=.212), contrasting Hypothesis 4.
A 2 (pretest vs. posttest) X 2 (control vs. cognitive load) factorial ANOVA was conducted to
compare the main effects of time of test and condition and the interaction effect between time of test
and condition on loyalty/betrayal moral foundation scores. The main effect of time was significant
(Λ=.795, F(1, 32)=8.244, p=.007), indicating that pretest loyalty/betrayal moral foundation scores
(M=15.441, SD=3.807) were significantly higher than posttest scores (M=14.118, SD=5.080). The
main effect of condition was not significant (F(1, 32)=.329, p=.570). The interaction effect between
time of test and condition was also not significant (Λ=.999, F(1, 32)=.037, p=.849), not supporting
Hypothesis 4. A 2 (pretest vs. posttest) X 2 (control vs. cognitive load) factorial ANOVA was
conducted to compare the main effects of time of test and condition and the interaction effect

Moral Foundations and Thinking Styles

17

between time of test and condition on authority/subversion moral foundation scores. The main effect
of time was significant (Λ=.815, F(1, 32)=7.248, p=.011), indicating that pretest
authority/subversion moral foundation scores (M=15.824, SD=3.966) were significantly higher than
posttest scores (M=14.824, SD=4.988). The main effect of condition was not significant (F(1,
32)=.386, p=.539). The interaction effect between time of test and condition was also not significant
(Λ=.988, F(1, 32)=.401, p=.531), not confirming Hypothesis 4. Finally, a 2 (pretest vs. posttest) X 2
(control vs. cognitive load) factorial ANOVA was conducted to compare the main effects of time of
test and condition and the interaction effect between time of test and condition on
sanctity/degradation moral foundation scores. The main effect of time was significant (Λ=.765, F(1,
32)=9.815, p=.004), indicating that pretest sanctity/degradation moral foundation scores (M=13.559,
SD=4.627) were significantly higher than posttest scores(M=12.441, SD=5.264). The main effect of
condition was not significant (F(1, 32)=.005, p=.945). The interaction effect between time of test
and condition was also not significant (Λ=.992, F(1, 32)=.245, p=.624), contrasting Hypothesis 4.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to examine the effects that intuitive and analytic thinking styles
have on moral foundations. Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, which predicted a positive relationship
between affective intuition and the harm/care moral foundation and negative relationships between
cognitive reflection scores and the pretest loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and
sanctity/degradation moral foundations respectively, were not confirmed. None of these predicted
relationships were significant. These results contrast the relationships previously noted in Study 1
and by Pennycook et al. (2014). Given that the previous authors had larger sample sizes than was
obtained in this study, it is possible that the results of the current study were limited by the small
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sample size. A larger sample size in the present study may have yielded the predicted results in
relation to the first two hypotheses.
The third hypothesis, predicting that participants under cognitive load would rely more on
individualizing moral foundations than participants not under cognitive load, was also not
confirmed. While the behavioral moral scenarios measure was a strength of the study, perhaps the
cognitive load task did not correctly induce intuitive thinking, thereby limiting participants’ reliance
on individualizing moral values when responding to the moral scenarios. These results have
implications suggesting that people will make the same moral decisions regardless of the style of
thinking they are using and the cognitive load they are facing.
Finally, the fourth hypothesis, expecting that participants in the control group would not
differ in their pre- and posttest moral foundations scores but that participants under cognitive load
would have scores that shift more towards individualizing moral values in their posttest moral
foundations scores as compared to their pretest moral foundations scores was not confirmed. This
observation offers some support for the results noted by Tinghög et al. (2016) that intuitive thinking
styles did not influence moral judgements. Furthermore, these results contrast those noted by Greene
et al. (2008) and Björklund (2003) which indicated that cognitive load and time restraints have an
effect on moral judgements and moral reasoning. Manipulation checks were not used in this study,
presenting a limitation. Although attempting to induce a specific thinking style is a strength of this
study, it is conceivable that the cognitive load placed on participants in this study was not enough to
induce a truly intuitive thinking style. It is also possible that the moral scenarios induced a different,
unintended thinking style and caused participants to rely on different moral foundation. Future
research should experiment with other methods of inducing cognitive load and include manipulation
checks to ensure that the cognitive load had the desired effect.
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Unexpectedly, it was noted that participants had higher scores on the pretest loyalty/betrayal,
authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation moral foundations subscales compared to the posttest
subscales. These results have implications that reliance on binding moral values may decrease over
time. It is plausible that participants recognized the questions on the posttest from the pretest and, as
a result, did not spend as much time or effort answering the posttest questions. Future research
should attempt to control for this recognition by changing the order in which the posttest questions
are presented, thereby reducing the likelihood that participants could answer from memory and
requiring participants to pay attention to each question.
Finally, the three types of intuition were not related to any of the five moral foundations. This
observation may have implications relating to Haidt’s (2012) idea that intuition comes first and
moral beliefs are later used as reasoning for a decision. Perhaps the types of intuition people rely on
most do not influence the moral beliefs they use to justify their decisions. Future research should
attempt to induced specific types of intuition (holistic, inferential, and affective) and measure which
moral foundations are relied on the most when people are using these different types of intuition.
Overall, intuition was not related to moral beliefs and different thinking styles did not appear to
influence the moral foundations that people rely on when making decisions. Going forward,
researchers should examine these conclusions further using different techniques and measures as
these results could have applications for the type of environments critical decisions, such as
decisions of war or decisions affecting an entire country, are made.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlations for Study 1.
Measure
M
SD
1. Harm/Care Foundation
20.571
4.778
2. Fairness/Cheating Foundation
19.978
4.377
3. Loyalty/Betrayal Foundation
15.242
5.355
4. Authority/Subversion Foundation
15.758
5.280
5. Sanctity/Degradation Foundation
13.835
5.556
6. Holistic Intuition
3.053
.521
7. Inferential Intuition
3.913
.375
8. Affective Intuition
3.028
.705
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

1
─
.774**
.500**
.334**
.306**
.096
.160
.452**

2
91
─
.407**
.288**
.164
.016
.307**
.191

3
91
91
─
.733**
.610**
-.031
.071
.081

4
91
91
91
─
.630**
-.172
-.104
.081

5
91
91
91
91
─
-.226*
-.242*
.145

6
80
80
80
80
80
─
.325**
.165

7
80
80
80
80
80
80
─
-.005

8
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
─
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Table 2
Predicting Moral Foundations and Types of Intuition.
Predictor
Holistic Intuition

β
-.036

t-value Significance
-.333
.740

Inferential Intuition
Affective Intuition

.174
.459

1.630
4.490

.107
.000

Fairness/Cheating Foundation
R2=.147

Holistic Intuition

-.134

-1.176

.243

Inferential Intuition
Affective Intuition

.351
.215

3.129
1.996

.002
.049

Loyalty/Betrayal Foundation
R2=.017

Holistic Intuition

-.078

-.638

.525

Inferential Intuition
Affective Intuition

.097
.095

.801
.818

.425
.416

Authority/Subversion Foundation Holistic Intuition
R2=.044
Inferential Intuition
Affective Intuition

-.176

-1.457

.149

-.046
.110

-.391
.968

.697
.336

Sanctity/Degredation Foundation Holistic Intuition
2
R =.113
Inferential Intuition
Affective Intuition

-.198

-1.707

.092

-.176
.177

-1.540
1.610

.128
.111

Holistic Intuition
R2=.095

Harm/Care Foundation

.178

1.126

.264

Fairness/Cheating Foundation
Loyalty/Betrayal Foundation
Authority/Subversion Foundation
Sanctity/Degredation Foundation

-.166
.183
-.142
-.273

-1.070
1.143
-.909
-1.938

.288
.257
.366
.056

Inferential Intuition
R2=.174

Harm/Care Foundation

-.091

-.602

.549

Fairness/Cheating Foundation
Loyalty/Betrayal Foundation
Authority/Subversion Foundation
Sanctity/Degredation Foundation

.293
.266
-.115
-.283

1.982
1.739
-.767
-2.102

.051
.086
.445
.039

Affective Intuition
R2=.260

Harm/Care Foundation

.631

4.406

.000

Fairness/Cheating Foundation
Loyalty/Betrayal Foundation
Authority/Subversion Foundation
Sanctity/Degredation Foundation

-.185
-.221
.164
.105

-1.320
-1.527
1.156
.827

.191
.131
.251
.411

Harm/Care Foundation
R2=.232

*Bolded betas are significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics and correlations for Study 2.
Measure
M
SD
1. Harm/Care Pretest
22
3.814
2. Fairness/Cheating Pretest
21.235
3.577
3. Loyalty/Betrayal Pretest
15.441
3.807
4. Authority/Subversion Pretest
15.824
3.966
5. Sanctity/Degradation Pretest
13.559
4.627
6. Holistic Intuition
21.088
3.370
7. Inferential Intuition
30.765
3.358
8. Affective Intuition
25.971
4.988
9. Cognitive Reflection
.222
.321
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

1
─
.602**
-.048
-.250
-.307
.108
.078
-.167
.206

2
34
─
-.455**
-.567**
-.462**
-.037
-.101
.060
.161

3
34
34
─
.694**
.644**
-.133
-.108
-.167
-.077

4
34
34
34
─
.825**
.006
-.033
-.178
-.124

5
34
34
34
34
─
.034
-.001
-.165
-.031

6
34
34
34
34
34
─
.345*
-.117
.231

7
34
34
34
34
34
34
─
.180
.261

8
34
34
34
34
34
34
34
─
.216

9
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
─
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Table 4
Factorial ANOVAs on Moral Foundations.

Time
Condition
Time X Condition
*p <.05 **p <.01

Harm/Care
Λ, F(1,32)
1, .000
0, .180
.996, .126

Fairness/Cheating
Λ, F(1,32)
.996, .132
0, .608
.952, 1.622

Loyalty/Betrayal
Λ, F(1,32)
.795, 8.244**
0, .329
.999, .037

Authority/Subversion
Λ, F(1,32)
.815, 7.248*
0, .386
.988, .401

Sanctity/Degradation
Λ, F(1,32)
.765, 9.815**
0, .005
.992, .245
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Appendix A

Moral Foundations Questionnaire
Part 1. When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following
considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this scale:
[0] = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and wrong)
[1] = not very relevant
[2] = slightly relevant
[3] = somewhat relevant
[4] = very relevant
[5] = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge right and wrong)
______1. Whether or not someone suffered emotionally
______2. Whether or not some people were treated differently than others
______3. Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country
______4. Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority
______5. Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency
______6. Whether or not someone was good at math
______7. Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable
______8. Whether or not someone acted unfairly
______9. Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group
______10. Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society
______11. Whether or not someone did something disgusting
______12. Whether or not someone was cruel
______13. Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights
______14. Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty
______15. Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder
______16. Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of
Part 2. Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement:
[0]
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
Strongly
Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Moderately
Strongly
disagree
disagree
disagree
agree
agree
agree
______17. Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue.
______18. When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that
everyone is treated fairly.
______19. I am proud of my country’s history.
______20. Respect for authority is something all children need to learn.
______21. People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed.
______22. It is better to do good than to do bad.
______23. One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal.
______24. Justice is the most important requirement for a society.
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______25. People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something
wrong.
______26. Men and women each have different roles to play in society.
______27. I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural.
______28. It can never be right to kill a human being.
______29. I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children
inherit nothing.
______30. It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself.
______31. If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey
anyway because that is my duty.
______32. Chastity is an important and valuable virtue.
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Appendix B

Types of Intuition Scale
We are interested in how you make decisions and solve problems in your life. Read each of the
following statements and rate the extent to which you would agree that that statement is true of you
using the scale below. These items have no right or wrong answers; just respond based on what is
true for you.
1
Definitely false

2
Mostly false

3
Undecided
(neither true nor
false)

4
Mostly true

5
Definitely true

_____ 1. When tackling a new project, I concentrate on big ideas rather than the details.
_____ 2. I trust my intuitions, especially in familiar situations.
_____ 3. I prefer to use my emotional hunches to deal with a problem, rather than thinking about it.
_____ 4. Familiar problems can often be solved intuitively.
_____ 5. There is a logical justification for most of my intuitive judgments.
_____ 6. I rarely allow my emotional reactions to override logic.
_____ 7. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions.
_____ 8. My intuitions come to me very quickly.
_____ 9. I would rather think in terms of theories than facts.
_____ 10. My intuitions are based on my experience.
_____ 11. I often make decisions based on my gut feelings, even when the decision is contrary to
objective information.
_____ 12. When working on a complex problem or decision I tend to focus on the details and
lose sight of the big picture.
_____ 13. I believe in trusting my hunches.
_____ 14. I prefer concrete facts over abstract theories.
_____ 15. When making a quick decision in my area of expertise, I can justify the decision
logically.
_____ 16. I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions.
_____ 17. If I have to, I can usually give reasons for my intuitions.
_____ 18. I prefer to follow my head rather than my heart.
_____ 19. I enjoy thinking in abstract terms.
_____ 20. I try to keep in mind the big picture when working on a complex problem.
_____ 21. When I make intuitive decisions, I can usually explain the logic behind my decision.
_____ 22. It is foolish to base important decisions on feelings.
_____ 23. I am a “big picture” person.
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Appendix C

Cognitive Reflection Test
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the
ball cost? _____ cents. [Correct = 5 cents; Intuitive = 10 cents]
Were you familiar with the answer to this question before this study? Yes___No____
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make
100 widgets? _____ minutes [Correct = 5 minutes; Intuitive = 100 minutes]
Were you familiar with the answer to this question before this study? Yes___No____
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for
the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
_____ days [Correct = 47 days; Intuitive = 24 days]
Were you familiar with the answer to this question before this study? Yes___No____
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Appendix D
Moral Scenarios

Please indicate where on the scale you would fall when making a decision about the following
scenarios.
1. Imagine that you are in the Army. Your commanding officer tells you that you must leave an
injured soldier behind in order to make it to your next destination on time. You know that this
soldier is suffering and will likely die without any medical assistance. You decide to…
____ follow the orders from your commanding officer
____
____
____ help the injured soldier

2. The state requires two local high school, School A and School B, to combine into one high school.
The students from School A do not welcome the students from School B, take the best food from the
cafeteria line so the students from School B do not get much to eat, and take up all of the outside
tables so the students from School B are forced to sit inside. As a student from School A, you…
____ participate in the activities of the School A students because you are loyal to your own
school
____
____
____ start a petition to guarantee that the students from School B are treated fairly and are
able to enjoy all of the same amenities as the students of School B
3. You are setting the table for your friends who are coming over for dinner. All of a sudden, you
feel very sick and throw up on one of the plates. You wash the plate, but must set it on the table for
dinner. You decide to…
____ set the plate for one of your friends to use
____
____
____ take the plate for yourself

